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Costly signaling theory was developed in both economics and
biology and has been used to explain a wide range of phenomena.
However, the theory’s prediction that signal cost can enforce in-
formation quality in the design of new communication systems
has never been put to an empirical test. Here we show that im-
posing time costs on reporting extreme scores can improve crowd
wisdom in a previously cost-free rating system. We developed an
online game where individuals interacted repeatedly with simu-
lated services and rated them for satisfaction. We associated rat-
ings with differential time costs by endowing the graphical user
interface that solicited ratings from the users with “physics,” in-
cluding an initial (default) slider position and friction. When rat-
ings were not associated with differential cost (all scores from 0 to
100 could be given by an equally low-cost click on the screen),
scores correlated only weakly with objective service quality. How-
ever, introducing differential time costs, proportional to the deviation
from the mean score, improved correlations between subjective rat-
ing scores and objective service performance and lowered the sample
size required for obtaining reliable, averaged crowd estimates. Boost-
ing time costs for reporting extreme scores further facilitated the
detection of top performances. Thus, human collective online behav-
ior, which is typically cost-free, can be made more informative by
applying costly signaling via the virtual physics of rating devices.
crowd wisdom | costly signaling | online rating | collective behavior |
social networks
One of the most appealing features of online communicationis the high speed and low cost of sharing unfiltered opin-
ions, ideas, and ratings. But theory predicts a validity crisis of
cost-free communication: In both economics and biology, costly
signaling theory suggests that to maintain reliability, communi-
cation systems must be based on costly signals (1–4), or at least
on signals that are costly for dishonest signalers (5). Signaling
cost ensures that cheating would not pay (or would not be pos-
sible) for signalers that are not strong enough and/or who are not
sufficiently motivated to signal. This principle explains, for ex-
ample, why male peacocks advertise their quality by growing a
long-ornamented tail (3, 6), why offspring signal their nutritional
needs by costly begging displays (7, 8), why among humans, job
candidates advertise their quality by top-school diplomas (1, 9,
10), and why economic wealth may be advertised by conspicuous
consumption (11, 12). In all of these cases, if signaling were cost-
free, cheating would prevail and the information value of signals
would have diminished.
In online rating, one can leverage the “wisdom of the crowd”
to improve the quality of information, by exploiting the phe-
nomenon that aggregate subjective ratings can be more accurate
than the rating of any individual (13–15). In that case the pre-
diction of costly signaling theory is subtler because signalers do
not usually communicate to advertise their own quality or needs
to gain something in return (such as a mate, food, or a job).
Instead, they express their opinion or share information in an
altruistic way, which does not seem to involve the conflict of
interests between signaler and receivers that typically motivates
cheating. But even if there is no motivation to cheat, there is, at
best, ambiguous direct benefit to the rater in providing an ac-
curate assessment of provider quality (16). Therefore, especially
in the absence of a conflict or clear, direct benefits, signalers are
likely to provide low-quality information. These considerations
raise two hypotheses: According to rational action theory (17,
18) in a communication ecology where the benefits are diffuse
and the costs are borne by the individual, the best strategy to
improve the wisdom of the crowd (19) is to make rating as
costless as possible to reduce barriers for raters to provide the
best possible information. Alternatively, costly signaling theory
would suggest the opposite dynamic (20): By imposing a cost to
providing information and especially by imposing higher costs on
reporting extreme ratings, only those who are confident in their
assessment and highly motivated to share that assessment may be
willing to pay. In this way, the cost of signal production can filter
out unreliable cooperative signalers (21–25).
We tested these competing hypotheses by deploying costly
signaling in the design of a communication system: We de-
veloped two online games in which players use services and
provide ratings for these services. In the first game, subjects do
not expect to gain benefits in return for providing an accurate
rating (low incentive game). Such rating systems are ubiquitously
deployed for rating goods and services on the internet. In the
second game, subjects expect accurate rating scores to increase
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their financial gains (higher incentive game). Therefore, moti-
vation is expected to be low in the first game and higher in the
second one. In both conditions, we examine the effects of sig-
naling time cost on crowd wisdom.
Results
Testing Costly Signaling in a Low Incentive Game. In our first online
game, players maneuvered a simulated car to collect coins. They
received one cent for each coin collected. Roads were separated
by lakes, and players had to ride a simulated ferry to cross each
lake (Fig. 1A). The first two ferry rides were used as a training
set, with delays of 20 s and then 4 s, to set a common baseline for
ferry performance evaluations. Thereafter, we randomly varied
the delays and speeds of ferry services. Some ferries arrived
immediately and traversed the lake without delay, allowing
subjects to complete the journey within 2 s. Other ferries were
delayed in arrival and slow moving, requiring up to 40 s to cross
(uniform distribution of times, 2–40 s). At the end of each ferry
ride, subjects were prompted to rate their satisfaction with the
ferry service on a scale of 0–100 before they could continue to
play (Fig. 1A, Right). Total game duration was limited to 15 min.
Subjects were therefore motivated to complete their ranking as
soon as possible as this subtracted from their time to collect
monetary rewards. Before the game, subjects were informed that
ferry services will vary in speed and delay and were asked to
accurately score their satisfaction after each service event. Game
sessions were timed and synchronized to create an experience
similar to that of a multiplayer online game (Methods, Synchro-
nization of cohorts). In a survey after game completion, subjects
were not able to reliably guess if their rating scores affected ferry
performances (Methods, Postgame survey). Each individual used
the ferry services several times (mean = 17.6 rides per subject).
Thus, we were able to measure correlations between subjective
ratings and objective service performance (total time to take the
ferry) both within and across subjects (26). Since repeated rating
scores are not independent measures, statistical evaluations were
done at the subject level (Methods, Shuffle-statistics bootstrap
95% confidence intervals and Shuffle-statistics P values).
We manipulated signaling time costs via the “physics” of the
graphic user interface that recorded the ratings. This allowed us
Fig. 1. Slider initial position affects distribution of rating scores. (A) Ferry-service rating game. (Left) Flowchart of the ferry services simulation game. (Middle)
Subject maneuvering a simulated car to collect coins. (Right) Waiting for ferry service to cross a lake. Subsequently, players were asked to rate their satis-
faction with the ferry service along an analog visual scale of 0–100. (B) Rating devices of the six experimental groups (n = 40 subjects × 6 groups). (B, Top) Click
bar. Sliders, including two push buttons that move the cursor (black triangle) either left or right at a constant velocity. Groups differ in the initial position of
the cursor: either 0, 25, 50, 75, or 100. (C) Smoothed histogram of ferry rating scores for the click-bar group. (D) Smoothed histograms of ferry rating for the
five slider groups. Peaks represent cases where subjects submitted default scores. (E) Scatterplot of ferry delays versus raw rating scores. Lines represent
within-subject regression slopes. Horizontal clusters of markers indicate cases where subjects submitted default scores.















to test if signaling costs can affect the correlation between sub-
jective rating and ground truth. For the control group, we used a
click bar where all scores from 0 to 100 could be given by an instant
click on the screen (all ratings are equally “cheap”). This represents
the conventional cost-free method used in most rating systems. For
all other groups we imposed differential signaling time cost using
“sliders”: A slider has an initial default position and “velocity,”
which can be easily manipulated (Fig. 1B) to impose a feeling of
“friction” while moving the slider. After each ferry ride, subjects
were prompted to rate their satisfaction with the ferry by adjusting
the slider position using two buttons: pressing continuously on ei-
ther the left or right button moved the slider, at a constant velocity,
toward the desired position on the scale. This moderate constant
friction allows reporting of scores within less than 3 s. That is, time
costs of reporting scores increased linearly with distance from initial
slider position at the range of a few seconds.
We tested six groups, with n = 40 subjects per group, and with
repeated trials adding to about 600–800 rating scores per group: the
control group rated ferry rides using a click bar. The remaining five
groups rated ferry rides using the slider with initial default position
at 0, 25, 50, 75, or 100 (Fig. 1B). For each group the time cost of
rating is proportional to the distance from these defaults. Setting an
initial slider position at 0 imposes time costs that are proportional
to the reported quality, an initial position at 100 imposes time costs
that are inversely proportional to the reported quality, and setting
an initial position near the center of the expected distribution of
scores imposes time costs that are proportional to the deviation
from expectation (either up or down). We planned to test whether
each of these conditions differs from the no-cost click-bar condi-
tion. Note that the initial slider position also offered a cheap default
score: subjects could simply accept it without even touching the
slider at no added time cost.
Fig. 1C presents a histogram of ratings for the click-bar (zero
cost) group, pooled over all subjects. As shown, the distribution
of rating scores is strongly skewed toward the upper end of the
scale (mean score = 78.3) despite the uniform distribution of
ferry delays. This is a common observation for online rating
systems where scores follow a J-shaped distribution (27, 28). In
the slider groups, histograms of subjective ratings showed simi-
larly skewed distributions, except that the distributions show a
peak at 100 (an upper-edge effect of the device, Fig. 1D) and a
second peak at the initial default position of the slider. This
second peak represents cases where subjects most likely sub-
mitted their scores without changing the default slider position.
Note that the height of these “default” peaks increases with the
initial slider position (lowest at 0 and highest at 100), most likely
due to subjects’ higher tendency to “accept” a default slider
position that is similar to the rating score they had in mind. This
result is consistent with our working hypothesis according to
which the time cost motivates subjects to accept the default
unless they have strong contrary opinion. Default ratings are also
apparent in the scatterplots of ferry delays versus rating scores
for each group (Fig. 1E). Within-subject linear regression esti-
mates are plotted as lines in Fig. 1E. Interestingly, the scatter-
plots and regression lines appear tightest in the slider-75 group,
where the default peak was closest to the population mean
(mean score = 76.5, median = 81, pooled over all groups).
Fig. 2A presents the coefficients of determination, R2s, of ferry
delays on rating scores pooled over all subjects. R2s for the
slider-50 and slider-75 groups were about twice those in the click-
bar group. Planned pairwise comparisons using shuffle statistics
(i.e., shuffling subjects across groups; Methods, Shuffle-statistics P
values) reveal a statistically significant difference in R2s between
the click-bar group and the slider-50 and slider-75 groups (P =
0.017 and 0.004, respectively, Bonferroni adjusted direct P values
for five comparisons). Differences in R2s between click-bar and
other slider groups were not significant (slider 0: P = 0.203; slider
25: P = 0.3; slider 100: P = 0.104, uncorrected). Interestingly,
despite the significant effect on the pooled correlations, R2s
obtained within subjects were fairly similar and show no trends
across groups (Fig. 2B). Therefore, the advantage of slider
50 and slider 75 appears to be in “calibrating” the rating scores at
the crowd level. Since the initial position of slider 75 is close to
the center of distribution of scores, this outcome is consistent
with the notion that imposing time costs, proportional to de-
viation from expected reported quality should improve reliability
via calibration. However, reliability could have improved for
other reasons as well—e.g., slowing the rating action could have
evinced increased accuracy. We therefore tested if the phe-
nomenon can be replicated in a very different context, where the
physical effect of the slider is preserved but rating is not asso-
ciated with clear benefits or time costs during a game. To test
this, we gave a neutral estimation task to a new group of subjects,
by asking them to estimate the number of matches in an image
(Methods, Design and programming of matches estimation task and
Matches estimation task). We found that correlations between
estimates and true number of matches obtained with a click bar
were nearly identical to those obtained with a slider with an
initial position at the center of the estimate’s distribution (Fig.
2C, n = 40 subjects × 2 groups, not significant). This negative
result suggests that there was nothing particular about the rating
device that could have driven the differences.
Evaluation of crowd wisdom.Online rating systems are often used to
leverage the wisdom of the crowd (13). Namely, aggregating
judgments across subjects can often improve accuracy by bal-
ancing idiosyncratic biases across individuals when averaging
observations. To determine if costly signaling also benefits these
crowd estimates, we binned ferry delays into 20 performance
categories according to their time delays (2-s bins: 1–2, 3–4,
5–6,. . ., 39–40 s). Within each bin we averaged the scores across
subjects and calculated the R2s between those averaged scores
and ferry delays across bins. As expected, the averaged R2s of the
binned data were very high, (about 0.9) in all groups (SI Ap-
pendix, Fig. S1A). We can now ask two practical questions: First,
how does the rating device affect the sample size needed before
objective performance differences can be detected? Second, how
does the rating device affect the efficiency of different selection
regimes over time? For example, how fast can one learn to select
top-performing ferries while sampling rating scores from differ-
ent bins? We focus on sample size because rating systems are
subject to a tradeoff between speed and accuracy: improving
accuracy requires aggregating more rating data over time, at the
expense of timely response (29).
To estimate the sample size needed for reliably distinguishing
across objective performance groupings, we drew random sam-
ples of rating scores from binned groups of ferry performances
and calculated averaged R2s for different “crowd” (sample) sizes.
As shown in SI Appendix, Fig. S1B, in the slider-75 group a
sample size of about six rating scores from each bin was sufficient
to explain 75% of the variance in rating scores across perfor-
mance groupings. In contrast, a sample of about 20 ratings from
each bin was needed to reach the same level in the click-bar
group. SI Appendix, Fig. S1C summarizes the differences in R2
s across all sample sizes for each group. Thus, the benefit of
costly signaling is also evident with respect to crowd wisdom.
To quantitatively evaluate how costly rating devices may affect
the efficiency of different selection policies over time, consider
an agent who needs to select ferry services on a regular basis. If
service quality fluctuates it is critical to update the selection
policy as soon as possible (based on small samples of ferry
scores). To simulate such a situation, we consider each ferry
performance bin as representing the performance of a particular
ferry service provider (i.e., 20 providers with time delays of 1–2,
3–4, 5–6 s, etc.). We then simulated a dispatcher who needs to
select the best (or to avoid the worst) provider by evaluating the
provider’s rating scores. The dispatcher initially deploys the
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providers at random with equal probability and, in turn, receives
subjective rating scores on user satisfaction. The dispatcher up-
dates the probability of selecting a provider by, either increasing
it for providers that received the top scores (selection favoring
top ratings), or alternatively, reducing it for those that received
low scores (selection avoiding bottom ratings). As an estimate of
learning speed, we computed the number of ratings needed for
the dispatcher to cut the expected ferry delays by half.
As expected, estimates of learning speed mirrored the corre-
lations presented earlier: the simulated dispatcher learned faster
using rating data obtained with slider 75 compared with click bar
(Fig. 2D). Learning was particularly slow with slider 100, where
time costs were negatively proportional to the reported quality.
Interestingly, costly rating devices learning speed varied strongly
across selection regimes: Fig. 2D compares learning durations
for a dispatcher that favors providers with top ratings (horizontal
axis) versus a dispatcher who avoids providers with bottom rat-
ings (vertical axis). We see an asymmetry in learning durations
across the slider groups: Mean learning durations for sliders 50,
75, and 100 are below the diagonal, whereas sliders 0 and 25 are
above the diagonal. Therefore, simulation suggests that with high
initial slider position, it might be easier to avoid poor ferry ser-
vices, and with low initial position, it might be easier to pick top
ferry services. In the absence of cost (click bar) the two selection
methods performed the same.
Since scores that took longer to report (due to their distance
from initial position) appear to be more informative than scores
that took little or no time to report, it makes sense to test, more
generally, if weighting each rating score by its time cost can
improve correlations. We pooled all data for the slider groups
(n = 3,880 scores from 200 subjects), and calculated the R2s
between scores and ferry delays either as is, or after giving each
rating score a weight based on its time cost (distance from initial
slider position). We found that the R2s between ferry delays and
rating scores is significantly higher when scores are cost weighted
(Fig. 2E, P = 0.009, bootstrap analysis; Methods, Shuffle-statistics
P values). Some, but not all of this effect is due to removal of
default scores (where time cost is 0). For example, in the
Fig. 2. Evaluation of crowd wisdom across rating devices. (A) Pooled R2 with 95% confidence intervals for each group. P values are Bonferroni adjusted. (B)
Within-subject R2 with 95% confidence intervals for each group. (C) Pooled and within-subject R2 for matches estimation task, comparing click bar (blue, n =
40 subjects), and slider (red, n = 40 subjects). (D) Means and 95% confidence intervals for simulation of learning by an agent that selects and learns to prefer
ferry services according to their rating scores. Learning duration is estimated by iterations it takes to reduce selected ferry delays by half. The x axis shows
results of an agent that selects for top-scored services, and the y axis shows results for an agent that avoids the bottom-scored services. (E) R2s of raw scores
versus weighted R2s of scores by time costs, pooled across all slider groups.















slider-75 group, removing default scores increase pooled R2
from 0.30 to 0.37, but the cost-weighted correlation increased
it further to 0.43.
Manipulations of cost functions. Given that imposing time costs on
reporting extreme scores appears to increase reliability, we
sought to examine whether imposing even greater time costs
might further improve reliability. To do this we experimented
with variable-friction sliders as shown in Fig. 3A. For each slider
we set friction to be an increasing function of the deviation from
its initial position. In this way, we imposed a steep time cost of up
to 10 s for reporting extreme deviations from the default. We
tested three groups: slider-0 cost, slider-50 cost, and slider-
75 cost with n = 40 subjects per group, and compared results
to those of the corresponding low-friction slider groups. In all
three “slider-cost” groups, imposing higher friction eliminated
high concentrations of scores at the top (Fig. 3B and SI Appendix,
Fig. S2) and shifted the distributions of rating scores toward a
normal distribution, as indicated by the lower Kolmogorov–
Smirnov statistics (Fig. 3B). However, despite the improvements
in distribution shapes, imposing high time costs on reporting
extreme scores did not affect R2s (Fig. 3 C and D). Still, the
effect of costs at the margins of the distribution of scores
changed the efficiency of different selection policies over time
(Fig. 3E): In all groups, increasing time cost shortened simulated
learning duration for selecting services based on top scores,
compared with baseline (see arrows in Fig. 3E). In contrast,
selecting against bottom scores, learning duration was either
longer (for slider 0 and slider 50) or unchanged (for slider 75).
This asymmetry has a simple explanation: In our ferry simulation
game, subjects were willing to pay high time costs for reporting
top scores but not for reporting bottom scores (see slider-50 cost
and slider-75 cost in SI Appendix, Fig. S2).
Testing Costly Signaling in a Higher Incentive Game. According to
costly signaling theory, the failure to improve R2s by imposing
higher signaling time costs may be explained by a possible ceiling
effect of signaling cost relative to the benefit: In the current
game, signalers’ expectation of benefits in return to signaling
effort should be low. Therefore, perceived net benefits, and
hence motivation, should diminish quickly with signaling costs,
making extreme scores too costly (see Discussion). However, if
the perceived benefit of signaling can be enhanced, imposing a
steeper cost function should improve R2s. To test this prediction,
we developed a fast-pace game, where ferries from three dif-
ferent companies bring, in turns, coins to the player (Fig. 4A). As
in the previous game, subjects received a one cent bonus for each
coin, but here the rate of collecting coins is four times faster,
gains are directly linked to ferry companies’ performance, and
subjects were instructed to score ferries accurately to maximize their
gains. Subjects were not allowed to directly select companies, but
companies that perform poorly were occasionally replaced by new
ones. This replacement, in addition to changes in ferry performance
Fig. 3. Evaluation of crowd wisdom using variable-friction devices. (A) Cost functions of scores, comparing constant-friction sliders to variable-friction de-
vices. (B) Probability densities of rating scores that correspond to the cost functions above. Kolmogorov–Smirnov statistics represent deviation from normal
distribution. (C) Pooled R2s comparing sliders with the same initial positions but different cost function. (D) Same as in C within subject. (E) Means and 95%
confidence intervals for simulation of learning as in Fig. 2D.
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during the game, were designed to create the false impression that
accurate rating scores should increase monetary gains. In a survey
after the game, most subjects (incorrectly) guessed that the rating
scores they provided had affected, or might have affected ferry
performance (Methods, Postgame survey).
The game included 36 ferry trips. In trips 1–18 each ferry
brought two coins in each trip, and trip durations (ferry speed)
varied between 4 and 10 s (0.2–0.5 coins per second). Then,
during trips 19–36, we introduced a step increase in variation:
We increased the range of trip durations to 1–14 s and in-
troduced variability in the number of coins each ferry brought in
each trip in the range of 1–3 (0.1–1.5 coins per second). In a pilot
study, we found that the center of the distribution of scores in
this game is fairly close to the center of the scale (mean score =
54), and we therefore set the slider default position at 50. We
tested three groups with 40 subjects per group: click bar, slider 50
(low friction), and slider-50 cost (high friction), using the same
cost functions as in Fig. 3A.
As predicted by costly signaling theory, R2s were highest in the
slider-50-cost group (Fig. 4B). Planned pairwise comparisons using
shuffle statistics reveal a statistically significant difference in R2s
only between the click-bar group and the slider-50-cost groups (P =
0.024, Bonferroni adjusted). We next evaluate the efficiency of
different selection policies over time in each group (Fig. 4C). As
expected, rating scores obtained from the slider-50-cost group gave
the shortest learning durations. Note, however, that both slider
groups were superior to the click bar in the selection regime that
avoided bottom ratings. In contrast, only slider-50 cost was superior
to click bar in the selection regime that favored top ratings. This
outcome is similar to that of the previous experiment (Fig. 3E).
Here too, subjects were willing to pay high time costs for reporting
top scores, but less so for reporting bottom scores.
Fig. 4. Evaluation of crowd wisdom in a selection/rating game. (A, Top) Ferries from three different companies bring coins at different rates. (Bottom)
Replacement of poorly performing companies creates an impression of selection via players ratings. (B) Pooled R2 with 95% confidence intervals for each
group. Sliders cost functions are the same as in slider 50 and slider-50 cost in Fig. 3A. P values are Bonferroni adjusted. (C) Simulation of selection regimes (as
in Fig. 2D). (D) Histograms and scatterplots of rating scores vs. ferry performance during the first 18 trials with low variability of ferry performance. Per-
formance units are coins per second presented on a log scale. MI, mutual information. (E) Same as in D for trials 19–36 with high performance variability of
0.1–1.5 coins per second.















Finally, we look at rating behavior separately during the low
variation trials 1–18 and during the later high-variation trials
(Fig. 4 D and E). During the early, low-variation trials, scatter-
plot of ferry performances (coins per second) versus rating scores
show tighter determination of ferry performance on rating scores in
the slider-50-cost group compared with both the click bar and the
slider 50, with R2s almost two times higher in the cost group (Fig.
4D). In contrast, after the transition from low- to high-variation
trials (Fig. 4E) the distribution of rating scores remained broad
only in the slider-50-cost group, but became bimodal in the click bar
and slider 50, with clustering at the margins. Such polarized distri-
bution of rating scores should decrease information, and indeed,
here the benefits of the costly slider are better captured by mutual
information compared with R2s (Fig. 4E). In sum, in this dynamic
setting the variable-friction slider reduced the scatter in the center
of the distribution when variance in service performance was low
and prevented clustering at the margins of the distribution after the
transition to high variance. It remains to be tested if the benefits of
imposing time costs would generalize across different types of dy-
namic transitions in rating systems.
Discussion
Overall, comparing our results to the predictions implicit in ra-
tional action theory and costly signaling theory, the majority of
evidence suggests that rising costs for extreme scores yields
greater crowd wisdom even when there is no conflict or com-
petition among users. However, there appeared to be an asym-
metry: boosting time costs for reporting very low scores had
some negative effects, which is consistent with rational action
theory. Indeed, if raters have initially little or no motivation to
report low scores, increasing the cost of reporting such scores
may reduce their rating effort even further. We therefore suggest
that tuning signaling time costs should be viewed as an optimi-
zation problem of fitting appropriate costs to selection regimes
and to the expected motivation of the users (30).
More formally, our approach may be compared with existing
models of costly signaling of need (7, 31) where signalers differ in
the benefit they expect to gain in return for their signaling ef-
forts. In such models the benefit function increases mono-
tonically with diminishing returns, approaching an asymptote
(Fig. 5A). Note that although the asymptote is lower for, say, a
moderately hungry bird chick and higher for a very hungry chick,
both chicks always want more food (with declining but always
positive hunger). In the absence of signaling cost, all chicks
would beg with maximal intensity. But since begging calls may be
energetically costly, the optimal begging intensity lies at the point
where the difference between benefit and cost is maximized (Fig.
5A). Here, signaling cost makes the begging calls honest and
meaningful (32), and the parent can distinguish between differ-
ent levels of needs.
In a rating system, we consider signaling intensity as the dis-
tance of a rating score from the median score in either direction.
In this scenario, if rating behavior were to follow the model of
signaling depicted in Fig. 5A, we might expect a bimodal distri-
bution in the absence of cost. That is, each signaler might be
motivated to give an extreme rating of 0 or 100 even for slight
deviations from average quality under the belief that the benefits
to signaling increase with signaling intensity because extreme
scores are more likely to affect the behavior of the service pro-
vider. However, this is not what we found. Even with the non-
costly click bar, the vast majority of rating scores were not at the
extremes, suggesting that many raters’ benefit function was un-
like that of the “greedy” chick. That is, most raters had no in-
herent incentive to inflate scores. Rather, it is possible that they
tried to signal service quality as reliably as they could, believing
that rating accuracy was more effective than extremeness in
evincing the best response from the service provider. If this was
the case, each rater should expect maximal benefit for giving
accurate scores (Fig. 5B). This is akin to assuming that the chick
in the “signaling of need” example (Fig. 5A) has an optimal meal
size beyond which the benefit of receiving extra food becomes
negative (say, through feeling bloated and sick or regurgitating
the nutrition). Note that under such a scenario, even in the ab-
sence of signaling costs (Fig. 5B), the optimal signaling intensity
(score) is clearly different for different service qualities, forming
a reliable scoring system. Moreover, adding signaling costs will
shift scores closer to the mean, potentially negatively influencing
information quality (Fig. 5C). This scenario would be consistent
with rational action theory where scoring reliability is optimal in
the absence of cost.
That said, it has been suggested that even when signalers have
no reason to cheat or to signal unreliably, they are still prone to
make errors if they do not have full information (22, 23, 30). In
our rating setup this is expected because human perception of
service quality is affected by multiple factors, from subjective
attitude to perceptual and memory constraints. This implies that
raters do not know the accurate location of the peak of the
benefit curve for each ferry, which realistically creates a wide flat
peak of the benefit curves as described in Fig. 5D. Having such
flat peaks results in high variance in rating scores, and since the
flat area for moderate and extreme service qualities can partially
overlap, it is expected that even small variation in individual
attitude toward the service would result in a broad range of
scores for the same service quality. Here, introducing a signaling
cost becomes beneficial, as it forms clear, different optimal levels
of signaling, thus calibrating variation between raters and im-
proving reliability (Fig. 5E). In some other cases, introducing
signaling cost can also favor “no scoring” (and accepting the
default slider position) unless service quality is clearly good or
bad, making scoring sufficiently beneficial to outweigh the cost
(as illustrated by Fig. 5F). Although in practice the exact shapes
of the benefit curves in rating systems are unknown, it is easy to
experiment with different cost functions, as we did in this study,
and then design an optimal signaling cost function empirically.
Our study suggests that costly signaling theory may be imple-
mented to design more reliable communication systems. Signaling
cost can improve collective estimates and, in turn, smaller sample
sizes may be used to detect differences in satisfaction ratings under
higher cost regimes. This may be worth further investigation beyond
virtual rating systems because the rate of social learning across dis-
tributed social networks, where feedback is ongoing, may strongly
depend on the reliability of information obtained from small samples
(19, 33, 34). In addition to extending costly signaling theory, these
results should inform online rating systems currently being deployed
in e-commerce and elsewhere, which are currently polluted with low-
quality scores (35). We hope that the experimental approach pre-
sented here can be replicated, elaborated, and further generalized to
improve crowd wisdom in large-scale communication systems.
Methods
Subjects. A total of 520 subjects were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk
(M-Turk). We required subjects to be adult (over 18 y old) and to reside in the
United States. All subjects remained anonymous, and we did not collect any
demographic information. Subjects electronically signed an informed consent
before playing the simulation game (or evaluating photos of matches). Once
a subject finished the simulated ferry game (or matches evaluation), we assigned
him/herwith a completion credential, whichwas used to exclude the subject from
participating in the study more than once. These experiments were approved by
both the Institutional ReviewBoards (IRBs) of TheCityUniversity of NewYork (IRB
2015–0185) and Princeton University (IRB 0000008221).
In rare cases (1 of 80 in the matches game and 6 of 320 in the ferry game),
subjects failed to complete the task. In these cases, we compensated the
subjects and excluded the partial data obtained from them.
Design and Programming of Ferry Simulation Game. Subjects played the games
using their web browsers. Games were implemented using WebGL tech-
nology. Subject actions were automatically recorded to MySQL database
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tables for analysis. For the low incentive game, server-side code was pro-
grammed using PHP and MySQL. Client-side code was programmed in
JavaScript using PIXI-JS library for animation. For the higher incentive game,
client side was programmed in Unity.
Synchronization of cohorts. Game sessions were timed and synchronized to
create an experience similar to that of a multiplayer online game. Cohorts of
subjects were recruited viaM-Turk for each session about 20min prior to each
session onset. Once a subject logged in, a virtual “waiting room” was pre-
sented, with a timer countdown to the beginning of the session. At time 0, a
“gong” sound was played, and subjects were then presented with a 1-min
video with technical instructions for maneuvering the simulated car. The
game then started promptly.
Fig. 5. A graphic model of costly signaling of need (following ref. 32) adapted to the case of costly scoring of service quality. (A) In the original model (31) the term
“need” was derived from the notion that offspring in a great need benefit from receiving extra food more than satiated offspring and can therefore invest more in
costly signaling. In a rating system, the differential benefit effect of signaling low and high need may be replaced with scoring two different levels of either low or
high service quality satisfaction: moderate versus extreme (e.g., service perceived as 1 versus 2 SD below or above the mean). (B) When raters are motivated to signal
reliably they perceive the benefit curves as decreasing beyond the point representing true service quality, forming different peaks, and thus different signaling optima
for scoring moderate versus extreme service qualities (S*mdrt versus S*extrm, respectively). (C) Under the same conditions as in B, adding cost does not increase reliability
(does not increase the distance between S*mdrt and S*extrm). (D) When perceived service quality is not clear, the benefit peaks are flattened and there is no single
optimum, creating an overlap between the optimal scoring range of moderate and extreme service qualities, which reduces reliability. (E) Under the same conditions
as in D, introducing signaling cost sets clear different optima for scoring moderate and extreme qualities. (F) When signaling cost exceeds the benefit for moderate
scores, raters may only score extreme qualities and refrain from scoring moderate ones.
















Low incentive game. Subjects drove a simulated car on a road, with coins
presented in random locations on the road. Subjects used their keyboard to
control speed and to steer the car left or right to collect coins. They received a
one cent bonus for each coin collected. After driving a fixed distance, where
up to 5 coins could be collected (over about 10–25 s), the car reaches a lake. It
is then kept on hold until a ferry arrives and carries the car over the lake. The
ferry then unloads the car, and the player is prompted to score the ferry.
After that, the player gains control of the car, driving on the road again to
collect more coins. The game continues for 15 min in this manner, which
allows up to 24 ferry rides (trials) and collecting up to 120 coins. We coupled
the waiting time with ferry travel speed, such that ferries with short delays
moved fast, and those with long delays moved slow, to generate a linear
scale of overall service delays. The fastest ferry speed was 2 s, and additional
delays varied uniformly between 0 and 40 s. The first 2 ferry rides were used
to familiarize the subjects with the game, and were excluded from the
analysis: The first was set to a total of 20-s delay and the second to 4-s delay.
Thereafter delays were selected at random. Subjects were compensated
$2.00 for playing the simulation plus the bonus for collected coins.
Higher incentive game. Ferries from three different companies were
bringing coins to the subject in turn. Each company had a distinct ferry color
code. Ferry trips varied in their speed and in the number of coins they carry in
each trip. The game was composed of 36 trials. In trials 8, 15, 21, 27, and 32,
the ferry company with the lowest performance was replaced with a new
company. Replacement was announced one trial before it via a popup
message which stated “X ferry is going out of business due to low ratings. Y
ferry will soon replace it.” During trials 1–18 all ferries carried 2 coins, and
their speed ranged between 4 and 10 s. During trials 19–36, ferries carried
between 1 and 3 coins, and their speed ranged between 1 and 14 s. Game
duration was about 10 min. Subjects were compensated $2.00 for playing
the simulation plus $0.74 bonus for the 74 coins received.
Rating device (slider and click bar). After each ferry ride subjects were presented
a rating device. The click bar allows one to click anywhere on a scale from 0 to
100. The slider requires one to press a button tomove the slider left or right in
that same range starting from its default starting position. Friction of the
slider was set by adjusting the velocity of the moving slider. After selecting a
rating, subjects had to click a submit button to continue the game. While all
subjects were forced to submit a rating, they were allowed to submit their
rating without altering the default value presented to them.
Design of high-friction sliders. In the slider-0-cost group, slider design and in-
structions were the same as in the original slider-0 group. In slider-50-cost and
slider-75-cost groups, high friction (low velocity of slider) occurs close to the
origin and can be confused with a technical glitch (nonresponsive widget).
We therefore designed a scale with two distinct ranges: at the center (be-
tween 20 and 80), the widget presented a numeric 0–100 scale and friction
was low (slider moves faster). At the top and bottom 20% edge, labeled as
“super” and “bad,” were given high friction (slider moves slower) (Fig. 3A,
Top Right). Subjects (n = 40 per group) were instructed to use these ex-
tended ranges to report ferry rides where they were particularly satisfied or
frustrated with the ferry service.
Ferry services game groups. Subjects were instructed to score their satisfaction
with ferry services accurately: “Ferry services will change over time and oc-
casionally they may be delayed. In the end of each ferry ride you will be
prompted to score your satisfaction of the ferry performance. Please use the
rating device to report your satisfaction accurately after each ferry ride.” All
subjected were presented with the same scale for rating, ranging between
0 and 100. Each group included 40 subjects. Groups used either the click bar
or sliders with starting positions 0, 25, 50, 75, or 100.
Design and programming of matches estimation task. Piles of matches were
placed on a dark surface and photographed by D.C. Images were then
cropped and presented serially using the same WebGL mechanism as
described above.
Matches estimation task. Subjects were first presented with a 1-min video with
technical instructions. They were then presented serially with the images of
matches, ranging between 48 and 1,006, in a pseudorandom order. Each
imagewas presentedwith a rating device with a scale ranging between 0 and
1,200. Subjects reported their estimate using either a click bar or a slider, and
then pressed the submit button to evaluate the next image. Subjects were
compensated at the rate of $2.00 for completing this task, which took them
about 10–15 min.
Matches estimation groups. Control subjects were instructed as follows: “Look
carefully at each image and try to assess the number of matches displayed.
Do not try to count, just estimate by observing. Then click on the bar to
report your estimate. You may click again to correct, and once ready click
the submit button.” One group of 40 subjects estimated the number of
matches using a click bar. A second group of 40 subjects were presented with
the same matches estimation task, but estimated the matches using a slider,
with initial position set at 500. Instructions for this group were “look care-
fully at each image and try to assess the number of matches displayed. Do
not try to count, just estimate by observing. Then push left and right buttons
of the slider to report your estimate. Once ready click the submit button.”
Data Analysis. All data analysis was done with MATLAB 2017.
Correlation analysis. Since variables used in this study, ferry speed, duration, and
rating scores, are continuous, we used (Pearson R)2 to assess accuracy because
rating scores are correlated against a continuous (metric) variable (the ferry
delay and speed). However, since we evaluate relative service quality, Spear-
man rank correlations might also be appropriate. In practice, however, in our
data Pearson and Spearman correlations give nearly identical results.
Crowd estimates as function of sample size. Using 20 bins of ferry delays, we
randomly draw with replacement from the ratings submitted by subjects,
with N = 2, 3, . . ., 35 per bin (n = 35 was the smallest number of ratings
obtained per bin). For each of the 20 bins, we averaged the sampled ratings
to obtain “crowd estimates” in each bin. We then computed R2s of these
crowd estimates with the delays across the 20 bins. For example, for a
sample (crowd) size of n = 30, we averaged the 30 scores for each bin and
then computed the R2, comparing those average scores to the mean ferry
delay over the 20 bins. We repeated this procedure 1,000 times, each time
taking a new random sample and computed R2. The average of these
1,000 random draws for different sample sizes resulted in the curves shown
in Fig. S1B. We also computed the area under this curve (AUC) for a single
draw (AUC is the R2 value averaged across sample sizes). We then computed
the 5% and 95% bounds across 1,000 iterations. This gives a mean and 95%
confidence intervals of AUC across the 1,000 draws (Fig. S1C). For the
matches estimation task, we calculated AUC as described above, instead of
the 20 bins of ferry delays we used the 20 images of matches.
Shuffle-statistics bootstrap 95% confidence intervals. Bootstrapped error bars for
mean R2 and for AUC were computed by resampling subjects with replace-
ments within each group. We then computed the 5% and 95% bounds
across 1,000 iterations. For example, for computing 95% confidence interval for
the pooled R2s in the click-bar group (n = 40 subjects), we randomly selected
subjects in this group, with replacements, 40 times. We then computed the
pooled R2s for rating scores across those 40 randomly selected subjects. We re-
peated this to obtain 1,000 pooled bootstrap R2s, sorted them, and set indexes
50 and 950 as the 5% and 95% confidence interval. Note that error bars were
often asymmetric, particularly when close to the upper bound.
Shuffle-statistics P values. To assess statistical significance of pooled R2 dif-
ference between two groups (say between click bar vs. slider 75), we first
computed R2 for each group and calculated the absolute difference between
them. This baseline difference was then used to judge the differences between
random cohorts. For each run, we randomly selected half of the subjects of each
group to create a mixed group. We computed R2 for this mixed group, and then
again for a second randomly mixed group. We then calculated the absolute
difference between R2 (or AUC). We repeated this 1,000 time to obtain
1,000 estimates of random R2 differences, which we then compared with the
baseline. The proportion of cases where the bootstrap estimate difference was
larger than the baseline was our direct P value estimate. For assessing statistical
significance of AUC differences between two groups we repeated the same
procedure as above, replacing R2 with AUC.
Simulation of learning. For each experimental group, we simulated a dispatcher
who had to select among ferry service providers and observed a subjective
rating for each ferry ride. The corresponding objective ferry delays of the
provider were invisible to the dispatcher. The task of the dispatcher was to
select the ferry providers with the shortest delays or to avoid those with long
delays. There were 20 ferry providers spanning the range of delays (the same
20 bins as before). Note that within each bin ferry delays were similar, but the
observed rating scores were noisy.
The dispatcher aimed at either choosing the fastest, or at avoiding the
slowest ferries by considering (sampling) the rating scores. At any point in
time the dispatcher selected a provider i with probability pi. A rating for this
choice was obtained by drawing at random from the subjective rating col-
lected online from the ith delay bin. Initially, pi = 0.05 for all i = 1, . . ., 20.
After observing 40 ratings the dispatcher iterated on the selection policy by
updating the probabilities pi as follows: for selection for top scores, in-
crement the probability, pi ← pi + 0.005, for the provider i with the highest
rating among the 40 draws. For avoiding bottom scores, decrement the
probability, pi ← pi – 0.005, for the provider i with the lowest rating among
the 40 draws. Then renormalize the probabilities, pi ← pi/sumi = 1:20 pi;
compute the expected mean of sample ferry delays according to the current
probabilities, and repeat the process by drawing another 40 ratings as before.
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Keep running iterations, and stop when the expected mean of sampled ferry
delays is reduced by half.
Postgame Survey.
Low incentive game.A random sample of 234 participants was presentedwith a
survey immediately after the game. The survey question stated: “The study
design divided players into two groups. In one group, feedback affected
ferry performance, in the other group ferry performance was random. To
which group do you think you were assigned?” A total of 46% correctly
stated that ferry performance in their group was random. A total of 28%
stated that rating scores have, or might have affected ferry performance in
their group. The remaining 26% could not tell.
High incentive game. The same question above was asked of sample size = 100.
A total of 57% wrongly stated that rating scores have, or might have af-
fected ferry performance in their group. A total of 30% stated that ferry
performance in their group was random, and the remaining 13% could
not tell.
Data Availability. All data and code are available at Matlab files at the
Harvard Dataverse: Ratings of simulated ferry services and matches es-
timation (2018); doi: 10.7910/DVN/OCYAPW (https://dataverse.harvard.
edu/dataverse.xhtml?alias=AffectiveRatingData) (36).
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